EU-NATO relations: between necessary cooperation, inherent competition and the inescapable change of paradigm
Az Észak-atlanti Szerződés Szervezete a változás korában, SVKK, Budapest, 2005
Language of the original publication: Hungarian
EU-NATO relations are merely a symptom. They are the reflection of the power struggle between the two sides of the Atlantic on the one hand, and of intra-European schizophrenia on the other. At the heart of this complex arm-wrestling there is one single crucial issue at stake: European autonomy.
As regards the choice allegedly to be made between EU-NATO co-operation or competition, this is a false dilemma. In the current balance of power situation, both are inevitable. In fact, there is a deadlock: even if competition is inherent and will only go on increasing with the parallel evolution of the two organizations, co-operation is ensured - at least for the time being - thanks to a delicate balance, in which the two parties have fundamental interests (though antagonists in several respects) to maintain the status quo.
A retrospective outline stresses the fact that neither the advent of George W. Bush, nor 9/11, nor the Iraqi war constitute turning points. They have only brought into light and accelerated some deep tendencies being there from NATO's very inception. In the field of transatlantic relations, two decisive moments can be identified: the end of the bipolar era and the launch of European defence policy within the framework of the European Union (by the European Council of Cologne in June 1999, under the impulse of the Franco-British pseudo-consensus in Saint-Malo in December 1998). Even if strong continuities can be observed throughout the last half-century, the collapse of the bipolar system meant the radical change of the whole context, from which the lessons were however drawn only after one decade of preposterous hesitations.
And those latter are still not over. While going into the details of the large themes (such as the US’ attitude, the right of first refusal, the access to capabilities/refusal of "unnecessary" duplications, Member States being part of one of the two organizations but not of the other, the consultation mechanisms, operational planning, military capabilities and the definition of standards, the problem with multi-hatted troops, the division of the labour and guarantee of mutual assistance) an unimaginable number of surrealist polemics testify to the survival of transatlantic fictions to the detriment of a responsible awakening to realities.
Concerning the evolution towards European autonomy, it is useful to distinguish between impeding factors and accelerating elements. As for the first group, one should begin by mentioning the interests linked to maintaining NATO in its present form, as the institutionalization of Atlantic control over Europe. For the United States, this is inter alia about:
- a framework to legitimate its - not entirely altruistical - protectorate over its largest economic and commercial rival;
- the fig leaf to cover its interference in the intra-European affairs;
- an essential bridgehead on "the Eurasian chessboard";
- a division of risks and costs which is rather advantageous for him;
- a market all the more "captive" for its own defence industry because NATO standards and doctrines are worked out in and by Washington;
- pseudo-multilateral smokescreen for its military endeavours;
- a means to prevent its "proto-peer competitor" from becoming a fully-fledged international actor on its own right (by limiting each aspect - strategic, political, operational, industrial and technological – of European autonomy)
As for proponents of European autonomy, they need - at least temporarily - NATO even in its current asymmetrical shape, in order:
- to mobilize the majority of the governments of the EU (most of them Atlanticists, as opposed to their public opinions and despite long-term strategic requirements) in favour of the development of European capabilities;
- because their current level of military capabilities is far from what would be not only desirable, but also necessary for genuine autonomy in all circumstances.
Most importantly, intra-European divisions constitute a major
(Hajnalka Vincze, EU-NATO relations: between necessary cooperation, inherent competition and the inescapable change of paradigm, Az Észak-atlanti Szerződés Szervezete a változás korában, SVKK, Budapest, 2005, 78,525 characters)