The following lecture examines 1. Some characteristic features of the transatlantic relationship; 2. Some specificities of Central European countries; 3. The "why" and "how" of the participation in Iraq; 4. The controversial issue of collective defence.

Some characteristic features of the transatlantic relationship

The transatlantic relationship is today at a precarious point of equilibrium, marked by the power testing between the two sides of the Atlantic on one hand, and intra-European contradictions on the other. Both have at their heart the dilemma between European autonomy vs. unilateral Atlantic dependence. The current stalemate results from the fact that the United States is no longer able to fully maintain their control over their European partners-rivals, whereas those latter are not yet ready to fully assume their autonomy.

A) the issue of autonomy

• is at the center of the entire transatlantic conundrum and all the European hesitations
• a strategic concept, but whose bases are most concrete: their absence or reduction have repercussions in practically every sector of activity
• several aspects: political, operational, technological, industrial autonomy
• constitute together the precondition to the credibility of any external presence and any external action
• this autonomy is nevertheless put into question both from the outside (United States), and from the inside (Atlanticist Member States)
• European autonomy is to be defined in relation to the United States (which does not automatically mean "by opposition" to them)

B) co-operation or/and competition

• false dilemma: both are inevitable (due to the above mentioned balance in power relations)
• most frequently asked question on the subject of CFSP/ESDP (European foreign, security and defence policy): whether as a complement or as a counterweight to Washington’s policy
• only one honest answer: both - according to the specific case (i.e. agreement or dissension on a given issue)
• indispensable condition all hypotheses: European autonomy (the only way to make us credible both as an added value and as an alternative)

C) intra-European divisions

• dividing line on three levels: 1. bases of the transatlantic partnership (autonomy or subservience); 2. content of the integration project (Europe-power or Europe-space); 3. desirable evolution of the international system (multipolar or unipolar)
• transatlantic partnership: common objective to maintain and develop the partnership, fundamental divergences on the best way to achieve this (mutually respected autonomy and reciprocal dependences or unilateral abandonment of European autonomy)
• integration project: common objective to build the European Union, fundamental divergences on its content (fully-fledged political entity or a mutilated actor which only has policies in the fields and to the extent that it is useful or all the least indifferent for the United States)
• international system: common objective to make it sustainable, fundamental divergences on the suitable structure (multipolarity, only guarantor of genuine multilateralism, therefore of legitimacy, therefore of long-term stability or single transatlantic pole unbalanced inside and guarantor of directed multilateralism outside)

D) interests at stake on the two sides

The current situation of precarious balance is maintained because, the two parties have fundamental interests (though antagonists in several regards) to perpetuate the status quo.
• For the United States, its engagement in Europe (via NATO) allows him to ensure:
- a framework to legitimate its - not entirely altruistical - protectorate over its largest economic and commercial rival;
- the fig leaf to cover its interference in the intra-European affairs;
- an essential bridgehead on "the Eurasian chessboard";
- a division of risks and costs which is rather advantageous for him;
- a market all the more "captive" for its own defence industry because NATO standards and doctrines are worked out in and by Washington;
- pseudo-multilateral smokescreen for its military endeavours;
- a means to prevent its "proto-peer competitor" from becoming a fully-fledged international actor on its own right (by limiting each aspect - strategic, political, operational, industrial and technological – of European autonomy)
• The advocates of European sovereignty, they need - at least temporarily - NATO even in its current asymmetrical shape, in order:
- to mobilize the majority of the governments of the EU (most of them Atlanticists, as opposed to their public opinions and despite long-term strategic requirements) in favour of the development of European capabilities;
- because their current level of military capabilities is far from what would be not only desirable, but also necessary for genuine autonomy in all circumstances.

Some specificities of Central European countries

For multiple and various reasons, the countries of the ex-communist bloc nourished a global, and at the same time compartmentalized concept of their so-called  “euro-Atlantic" integration. In their vision, accession to NATO and entry in the European Union are the two faces of the same coin. This "return to the Occident" is imagined like a harmonious whole, where safety would be in "the NATO box", whereas prosperity would be ensured by "the EU box". This naive design is put to the test of reality, be it because of the structural tensions between two banks of the Atlantic, the increasing number of question marks on and around the US power or due to the European construction’s internal evolution.

A) common difficulties

• painful reform of the armed forces (territorial defense vs. projection capabilities)
• the inherent uncertainties of strategic planning in first half of the 1990’s
• over-commitments towards the Atlantic Alliance
• defence (and foreign policy) issues often taken hostage in the debates of domestic policy
• all these difficulties are far from being limited to CEE countries, but affect them more (heritage of the Warsaw Pact, absence of strategic reflection, extremely constrained budgetary conditions)

 B) Atlanticist affinities

• in the eyes of the CEE countries, only the United States (via NATO) seems to provide credible guarantees as regards the defence of their own territory (see below)
• because of the insufficiencies of their own military performance, they try to compensate by an inflation of promises and acts of allegiance towards the American power

C) new situation

• with the EU accession: "mission accomplished" calls a re-evaluation of the priorities which had dominated their foreign policy agendas since 1989
• first-hand experiment of the many transatlantic "quarrels"
• dynamics of the ESDP
• vast majority of the security challenges they face (mostly non military threats) is in EU competence
• their immediate neighbourhood (for instance the Balkans) is more and more under the military responsibility of the EU
• this progressive Europeanization of the reflection on defence issues is a process which affects both “old” and “new” Member States: it is a deep and long-term trend, continued even at the height of the Iraqi crisis (Franco-British summit in Le Touquet, first EU military operations of in March and June 2003, European Security Strategy, EU Military Staff complemented by a common European pre-headquarters, European Defence College etc.)

Case study 1: the participation in Iraq

At the time of the Iraqi crisis, Hungary was part of "new Europe" aligned on the position of the United States. The government accepted (in December 2002) that US Army uses the base of Taszár to train Iraqi emigrants there, and Prime Minister Medgyessy signed the famous "the Letter of Eight" published January 30 in support to Washington’s policy. The Parliament gave the green light to the transfer of NATO troops and the material bound for Turkey, and Hungary authorized – just like France and Belgium – the overflight of its airspace within the framework of American-British intervention in Iraq. However, the government firmly made a point of not sending combat troops. The Hungarian transport contingent (a battalion of 300 men) thus arrived on the spot in June 2003, at a time when UN Security Council resolution 1483 had already made a clear distinction between the "occupying powers" and the "States which are not occupying powers and which contribute to stability and safety in Iraq"
• in each country of the "coalition", the governmental position went counter to the overwhelming majority of public opinion
• specific CEE regional context: a certain kind of competition as regards pledges of fidelity towards the United States (in these circumstances it is difficult to remain outside)
• efforts of political compensation for lack of convincing military contributions in other (NATO) frameworks
• Prime Minister Medgyessy spoke of a "trap" in French “Libération” (according to this view: once the request for rallying was received, it would be politically inconceivable not to acknowledge)

Case study 2: collective defence

The collective defense of Europeans is today in an ambivalent situation between NATO’s non-real and the EU’s non-official guarantees. The attitude of CEE States is highly paradoxical: they are most avid of such guarantees, but they help to prevent the Union from fully assuming its role as a strategic actor able to fully offer them, And they do so in the name of their fidelity to an Alliance of virtual guarantees.
 
A) The reality of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty

”The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. "
- historically: the formula was conceived with the intention to entail the least possible obligation for the United States (Washington’s amendments to this effect in the draft text)
- after 9/11, 2001: Article 5 was invoked, then each ally made it clear that this only means they would decide at a national level on the way they come to the assistance of their “attacked” partner
- throughout the 1990’s: American insistence so that the Alliance goes beyond Article 5 missions

B) Rhetoric and behind

In the official texts and speeches the Alliance remains "the fundament of the collective defense of its Member States", the cornerstone of safety and stability in Europe. However, various actors use this same formula for various reasons.
- the United States: the mirage of the mutual assistance guarantee is a significant “bait” to attract Central and Eastern European “clientele”; provides a legitimation for its European protectorate and its presence on the Eurasian bridgehead
- new members: they borrow from American and Western-European rhetoric which underlines NATO’s collective defense mission because 1. they would like to believe in it 2. they hope to assert the primacy of the Alliance by doing that
- "old" Europeans, much more aware of the realities of the transatlantic relationship employ the formula 1. to find a breach for European defence (in particular crisis management which would thus not be in competition with a NATO stressing collective defense) 2. to try to limit NATO’s instrumentalisation in service of US global strategy 3. to better "sell" initiatives leading to European autonomy they accompany them with this comforting and well-enshrined formula

C) European realities

As ESDP evolves, the above-mentioned fictitious guarantee enters in conflict with the formulation of a genuine mutual assistance guarantee between Member States of the European Union (in order not to enter into conflict with Article 5, collective defence type commitment has been for many a taboo within the EU).
- In reality, the European Union’s treaties speak, since Amsterdam, of protecting "the integrity" of the Union, which could constitute, if necessary, a legal base for any mutual assistance measure
- In February 2004, General Gustav Hägglund, the then Chairman of the EU Military Committee, asked rhetorically in February, "If 280 million Americans can take care of their homeland security without European involvement, isn't it fair to expect the 450 million Europeans to arrange the defence of their area without the Americans?"
- Jean-Claude Juncker (Prime Minister of Luxembourg, one of the finest "connoisseurs" of EU affairs) had remarked, about the inclusion or exclusion of a mutual assistance clause in the new treaty (referred to as constitutional): “Does somebody really believe that, if we don’t introduce this clause in the treaty, the clause will not apply? It exists, whether we include it in the treaty or not. Politically, militarily, strategically, geographically, it [the mutual defence clause] exists. It is obvious.”